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This paper empirically establishes the effect of the employer’s term of notice on the wage 
level of employees. The term of notice is defined as the period an employer has to notify 
workers in advance of their upcoming dismissal. The wages paid during this period are an 
important element of firing costs and hence employment protection. To find a causal effect, I 
exploit the exogenous change in the term of notice that resulted from the introduction of a 
new Dutch law in 1999. Strong evidence is found that a longer ‘dormant' term of notice leads 
to higher wages. In my sample, an additional month of notice increases wages by three 
percent, ceteris paribus. 
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Employment protection legislation (EPL) has been on the (European) po-
litical agenda for several decades and continues to be widely debated. On
the one hand employers complain that they are incapable of adapting to
economic circumstances because of the high cost of ¯ring employees and on
the other hand vulnerable groups of employees complain that the ¯ring risk
they face is too large. Policy-makers in the meantime have to decide upon an
optimal level of protection. In order to make such decisions politicians need
to know how di®erent types of employment protection a®ect labor market
outcomes. In order to provide such answers, a large economic literature on
employment protection has been developed.
The rationale for installing employment protection legislation is clearly
not to manipulate wages. In practice EPL might however have a consider-
able impact on them. In fact, this impact is a central issue in the academic
EPL literature as it is closely related to the e®ect of employment protection
on employment levels1. How these two labor market outcomes are theo-
retically related depends on the type of employment protection (EP) under
investigation, on the relevant labor market institutions and on which fur-
ther assumptions the respective researcher makes. When one for example
considers a competitive economy with individual wage-setting as in Lazear
(1990), transferable ¯ring costs such as a severance payment will be shifted
to the worker at the onset of an employment contract. In Lazear's model,
wages will adjust downwards to take the future ¯ring costs into account and
employment will not be a®ected. Alternatively, one could consider central
wage bargaining by a union who cares for incumbent workers only and a
general turnover cost associated with dismissals as in Bertola (1990). Ac-
cording to insider/outsider theory, employment protection will then induce
unions to bargain for higher than competitive wages. As a result, ¯rms will
¯re (and hire) fewer workers.
Empirically, only suggestive evidence of the true relationship between
employment protection and wages exists. This is partly because most empir-
ical research has analyzed macro-data and composite employment protection
indices, which introduces comparability issues and confounding factors into
the estimations. This paper seeks to use the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel
(SEP) dataset to empirically establish the causal e®ect of a speci¯c type of
employment protection, namely the employer's term of notice (ToN), on the
wage level of employees. The term of notice is de¯ned here as the amount
of time an employer has to notify an employee in advance of her upcoming
1I do not discuss the empirical e®ect of employment protection on employment in
this paper. In order to do a similar ¯xed e®ects analysis for employment rather than
wages, one would need a dataset containing a substantial number of individuals that are
observed over time as being both ¯red and non-¯red. The Dutch socio-economic panel
unfortunately features too little of these observations.
2dismissal. Speci¯c groups, notably older workers, are often protected by a
longer term of notice. The term of notice is usually ignored in the empirical
employment protection literature. This is unfortunate as a long term of no-
tice corresponds to a large number of obligatory wage payments and hence
is a substantial ¯ring cost to the employer.
The Dutch labor market has two relevant features that makes it suitable
as a research ground for this paper. First, for each worker, it is possible
to calculate the `dormant' term of notice. I de¯ne `dormant' here as the
notice period that would apply in case the employer would soon want to ¯re
the worker. The term of notice can be calculated because the law sets out
a formula to do so, which generates variation in the degree of employment
protection for workers of di®erent ages and tenure. Second, in 1999 the legal
formula to calculate the term of notice was changed. In short, low-tenured
workers of all ages bene¯ted from the introduction of the law on °exibility
and security as their employer's term of notice increased while older high-
tenured workers experienced a shorter term of notice after the 1st of January
1999. This paper will exploit this exogenous policy change to answer the
causality question and to separate the age, tenure and term of notice e®ects
on wages.
The remainder of this paper presents evidence of a strong positive causal
e®ect of the term of notice on wages. Each additional month increases wages
by three percent. It is also demonstrated that regressions that ignore the
multi-collinearity issues involved can overestimate this e®ect. The theoreti-
cal literature provides two plausible reasons for a positive e®ect of employ-
ment protection on wages. First, insider/outsider theory suggests that the
bargaining position of insiders is enhanced by better protection when unions
only represent incumbent workers. In wage negotiations this could then drive
wages up. Second, employment protection creates more incentives for ¯rms
and workers to invest in match-speci¯c human capital. These investments
will then lead to higher productivity and higher wages. Longitudinal data
re°ecting individual productivity in all types of jobs would be necessary to
ultimately distinguish between the alternative explanations. Unfortunately,
this is not available in The Netherlands. Using the alternative data at hand,
I do present suggestive evidence that invalidates the investment argument.
This paper continues as follows. Section 2 discusses the most important
¯ndings in the employment protection literature on wages. Section 3 then
lays out the term of notice regulations in The Netherlands and the changes
introduced in the law of °exibility and security (`Flexwet'). The empirical
strategy is explained in Section 4. The utilized data are discussed in Section
5 and results will be presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
32 Literature
2.1 Theoretical literature
Employment protection, i.e. ¯ring costs, comprises of two elements: taxes
to be paid outside the job-worker pair and transfers from the ¯rm to the
worker (Garibaldi and Violante, 2005, p.799). Taxes are broadly de¯ned
here: any kind of legal costs associated with layo®s fall under the ¯rst type.
The term of notice and the severance pay however fall under the second type
of employment protection. The length of the term of notice, or the num-
ber of additional wage payments, partly determines the size of the transfer
¯ring costs. An extensive theoretical literature looks into the e®ects of em-
ployment protection or ¯ring costs on the labor market. Concerning wages,
the predictions of what employment protection actually does vary greatly.
Many of these di®erences result from considering di®erent types of employ-
ment protection and di®erent types of labor market institutions. Some of
these views are explained in this section, although I do not claim to be ex-
haustive.
In the employment protection literature (e.g. Oi, 1962, and Bentolila
and Bertola, 1990), whether a pro¯t-maximizing ¯rm would like to ¯re an
individual worker primarily depends on the wage of the worker and her
match-speci¯c productivity2. When the di®erence between these entities is
negative, an employer loses money and she will consider ¯ring the employee.
It is costly however to adjust the number of employees downward because of
associated ¯ring costs. When wages are ¯xed and whenever there is a pos-
sibility that in the nearby future the worker's productivity could increase,
higher ¯ring costs such as a longer term of notice then lower the propensity
to ¯re (and hire) a worker.
Wages are exogenous in the greatest part of this literature. Notable
exceptions to this will be discussed here. Bertola (1990) draws from the in-
sider/outsider literature. See Lindbeck and Snower (2001) for an overview.
In short, the theory divides the labor market into insiders - incumbent work-
ers who bene¯t from employment protection - and outsiders - those who do
not bene¯t such as temporary workers and the unemployed. Because it
is di±cult to get rid of them, insiders have some bargaining power in the
wage process and hence demand higher than competitive wages (for a formal
model, see Lindbeck and Snower, 1986).
Bertola looks at how employment protection a®ects wages under di®erent
wage setting institutions. First, he investigates labor demand and endoge-
nous wages when wage negotiations take place at the individual level. He
¯nds that under certain assumptions total received wages might not be af-
fected, although outsiders might o®er to work for a very low wage in order to
become an insider and insiders might afterwards rise wage demands above
2This paper considers individual lay-o®s that have a ¯nancial ¯ring rationale.
4the competitive level. Second, Bertola assesses wages when there is a wage
setting union that cares for everyone in the labor market. He concludes
that in this set-up lifetime wages would also remain una®ected. Only in the
instance of unions who solely represent working members does employment
protection increase total labor income for insiders inde¯nitely.
Garibaldi and Violante (2005) exploit the idea that a country's wage-
setting institutions in°uence the e®ect of employment protection on wages
in a search and matching framework. The authors built a model with endoge-
nous wage setting behavior by a monopolistic union. Garibaldi and Violante
stress that in such a setting the introduction of an exogenous ¯ring cost has
two opposing e®ects on the workers' desired wage level: workers would like
to have a higher wage (the income e®ect) but do not enjoy the accompany-
ing higher probability to get ¯red (the job security e®ect). Whenever the
elasticity of the ¯rm's ¯ring probability to wages is low enough, workers will
demand higher wages when they are better protected.
Lazear (1990) wrote an in°uential paper on employment protection, ar-
guing that ¯ring costs do not necessarily a®ect hirings and ¯rings. He rea-
sons that in a °exible labor market, in the absence of contract and market
restrictions, transfer employment protection such as the term of notice could
be undone by e±cient wage setting behavior between workers and ¯rms. He
predicts that in a competitive economy with decentralized wage setting, ¯r-
ing costs drive wages down, up to the point where the severance pay and
the wages paid during the term of notice can be seen as a delayed payment.
Note that Lazear predicts wages to go down at the onset of an employment
contract. Pissarides (2001) also suggests a negative e®ect of employment
protection on wages, but argues from the workers point of view (like Bertola
and Rogerson, 1997). In his search and matching model the term of notice
is endogenous and generates lower wages because risk averse workers accept
a lower income during the productive period of a job, in order to receive a
higher income during unproductive times.
Because most of the relevant literature thinks about workers as having
¯xed or at least exogenous productivity, it often ignores another possible
route through which employment protection positively a®ects wages. More
employment protection namely enhances the incentives for a ¯rm to invest
in a worker and for a worker to invest in ¯rm-speci¯c human capital. Nickell
and Layard (1999) brie°y describe this mechanism. These human capital
investments could pay o® in terms of higher productivity and higher wages.
Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2004) present some indirect empirical ev-
idence that employment protection does increase training of employees. Us-
ing a European dataset, they ¯nd that those on ¯xed term contracts take
up less training than those on permanent contracts.
While certain theories thus suggest the term of notice could increase
wages, others argue it could decrease wages. The most appropriate theories
for this empirical study are the ones involving some market imperfections,
5moderate centralized wage-setting and exogenous employment protection.
Lazear's argument is hence not likely to hold in the Dutch economy, in
which employers organizations and a small number of labor unions negoti-
ate over wages per industry. For more information on wage setting in The
Netherlands see Wallerstein, Golden and Lange (1997).
2.2 Empirical literature
The empirical literature has experienced di±culties in establishing a clear
relationship between ¯ring costs and wages. Some of the papers discussed
in the previous subsection do attempt to present empirical evidence of their
models. However, the authors typically only provide suggestive evidence of
their theories, mainly because most of them use macro-data and aggregate
indices of employment protection that are hard to compare. The estimates
are furthermore troubled by confounding factors. Contrary to what his the-
oretical model predicts, Bertola (1990) for example presents some evidence
that the productivity wage gap is actually lower in countries with stricter
employment protection. The empirical wage setting literature in its turn
often ignores employment protection as it is so hard to quantify. See for ex-
ample the establishment-level study by Blanch°ower, Oswald and Garrett
(1990) and the cross-country study of industry wage di®erentials by Holm-
lund and Zetterberg (1991). Both papers do suggest substantial insider wage
gains.
An interesting ¯rm-level study by Autor, Kerr and Kugler (2007) in-
cludes employment protection - i.e. tax employment protection - explicitly.
The paper exploits U.S. state variation in the adoption of wrongful-discharge
protections in order to study ¯rm-level productivity di®erences. The authors
¯nd that the introduction of these laws coincided with a rise in capital in-
vestment, non-production worker employment and hence measured a labor
productivity increase. Another ¯rm-level analysis was published by Martins
(2009), who analyzes a Portuguese policy change in tax employment pro-
tection that favored ¯rms with twenty or less workers. In 1989 the strict
Portuguese rules and regulations considering layo®s were considerably soft-
ened, and more so for the smaller ¯rms. Using a large administrative dataset
that links employers to employees he ¯nds, among other things, that after
the policy change average wages in the smaller ¯rms fell more than in the
larger ¯rms. This suggests that in a highly regulated labor market the bet-
ter protected workers earn more.
The use of micro-data in the empirical employment protection literature
is limited. This is unfortunate as micro-data is often a prerequisite for iden-
tifying causality and as even in highly regulated economies wages are very
heterogeneous across workers of di®erent ages and tenure in the same ¯rms.
I am aware of only one micro study on employment protection and wages,
which is a paper by Leonardi and Pica (2007). The authors empirically ana-
6lyze the e®ect of severance payments on male wages by exploiting an Italian
policy change that introduced severance payments for unjust dismissals for
¯rms with less than ¯fteen employees. This policy change is explained in
more detail in Kugler and Pica (2008). Their paper, like mine, thus ana-
lyzes transfer employment protection rather than legal protection such as in
Martins (2009). Leonardi and Pica apply a regression discontinuity design,
with the discontinuity being the number of employees, to study entry wages
and the tenure wage pro¯le. They use individual wage information from an
administrative employers dataset from the Veneto region in Northern Italy.
Contrary to their theoretical predictions, the authors ¯nd no causal e®ect of
severance payments on entry wages. They do ¯nd that the average returns
to tenure of previously dismissed workers declined by three percent in the
smaller ¯rms, relative to larger ¯rms that did not experience an increase in
employment protection. Leonardi and Pica interpret this as partial evidence
for Lazear's argument that government-mandated employment protection
can be shifted to employees if any employment contract is allowed. Using a
Dutch dataset of individuals of all tenures and backgrounds, I ¯nd an op-
posite average e®ect of employment protection on wages, namely a strongly
signi¯cant positive one. Additional research should teach us which speci¯c
characteristics of the analyzed environments generate these di®erences.
3 Term of notice
There are two paths to dismissal in The Netherlands, and the legal term of
notice only applies to the labor o±ce path. This is a relatively slow route
that does not require severance payments. The labor o±ce has the discre-
tion to refuse an application, but only does so in a small percent of the cases
(i.e. ¯ve percent in 2002). Mainly individual lay-o®s in small- and medium
sized ¯rms and collective lay-o®s are dealt with by the labor o±ce, but the
path is open to all employers. The other route, through court, is faster
and involves substantial severance payments3. The cantonal court judge in
principle always allows a lay-o® but adapts the required severance payment
to the speci¯c ¯ring rationale (i.e. a worker receives more if the employer
could have done more to prevent the lay-o®)4. An employer is free to choose
a dismissal path and the labor o±ce is thus a credible threat to all work-
ers. Furthermore, nothing changed in the court procedure over the analyzed
3Figure A-1 in the appendix shows the ratio of lay-o®s through the labor o±ce over
the total number of lay-o®s. A constant percentage of about ¯fty percent of lay-o®s are
handled by the labor o±ce. A small increase in the ratio can be seen in 1999, the year
the legal term of notice was changed. It can be argued that the labor o±ce procedure
became more pro¯table that year because the term of notice went down for the majority
of workers.
4In a limited amount of cases a cantonal court judge refuses to end the labor contract,
for example when a sick worker is dismissed because of her illness.
7period. This means that the employer's term of notice and the associated
policy change are relevant to all employees on a permanent contract.
The policy change that will be exploited in the ¯xed e®ects method be-
low is the introduction of the law on °exibility and security (the `Flexwet')
in The Netherlands on January 1st, 1999. This law intended to diminish
di®erences in the labor market between temporary and permanent workers.
On the one hand, employees with temporary contracts received better le-
gal protection than before. On the other hand, employees with permanent
contracts lost some rights. The main change for tenured employees was the
adaptation and simpli¯cation of the legal formula for the term of notice. See
Heerma van Voss (1998) and Smitskam and Kronenburg-Willems (2000) for
a detailed description of the new law. The calculation of the term of notice
before the 1st of January 1999 (old-ToN) was as follows. For every year of
tenure an employer had to add a week to the notice period, with a maximum
of thirteen weeks. On top of this, workers received an extra week of notice
for each year they had worked while being forty-¯ve or older, also with a
maximum of thirteen weeks. Note that tenure - which determines the term
of notice - is legally de¯ned as the amount of time that has passed since one
started working for a certain employer.
The law introduced on the 1st of January 1999 consists of two elements:
a new term of notice formula for newly-hired employees and a transitory ar-
rangement for workers that were already employed. The new formula does
not depend on age5 and accommodates fewer term of notice possibilities.
For workers employed in between zero and four years employers face a term
of notice of one month. When a worker is employed between ¯ve and nine
years, her employer will have to notify her two months in advance. If a
worker's tenure is between ten and fourteen years, her employer will have to
notify her three months in advance. Any tenure longer than fourteen years
results in a term of notice of four months.
The `Flexwet' included an important transitory arrangement for those
workers that were already employed by the 1st of January 1999. For these
employees, the employer had to calculate both the old term of notice for the
employee's tenure and age on the 1st of January 1999 and the new term of
notice for the employee's tenure and age at the time of ¯ring. The longest
notice period of the two applied. This transitory arrangement was agreed
upon so that no workers would su®er a large sudden decline in EP. Another
feature of the new scheme was that for both newly hired workers and those
in the transitory scheme, the law allows employers to deduct one month of
the notice period if they have waited to end the labor agreement until after
they have received permission from the labor o±ce. The minimum term of
notice should however remain one month, so that the deduction only applies
5All age related components of Dutch employment laws are supposed to be phased
out in order to satisfy European anti-discrimination treaties.
8Figure 1: Employer's Term of Notice before and after the introduction of
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to workers with a tenure above four years. This subtraction is granted in
almost all relevant cases (i.e. ninety-six percent in 2002 according to the
Ministry of Social A®airs and Employment). In my `dormant' term of no-
tice calculations I assume that this permission is always granted. Note that
I de¯ne `dormant' here as the notice period that would apply in case the
employer would soon want to ¯re the worker. Hence, the introduction of
the `Flexwet' generated a discrete change in EP for many workers at the be-
ginning of 1999, and the transitory scheme ensured a further gradual move
towards the new scheme.
The relationship between the old and new term of notice thus depends
on age and tenure of the worker and on calendar time. More speci¯cally,
besides on tenure and time, it depends on tenure obtained from the age of
45 onwards. Figure 1 shows the old- and new-ToN for the respondents in
the entire SEP dataset over tenure and selected ages. As the term of notice
will be identical for all employees under 45, there is one panel representing
them. Additionally, three panels display the relationship between tenure
and the term of notice for all 50-, 55-, and 60-year old workers.
As can be seen in the below-45-panel, the old term of notice went up
by a week each tenure year and had a maximum of thirteen weeks. How the
policy change a®ected di®erent workers depends on their respective tenure.
9The new term of notice turns out to be longer than the old term of notice
for those employees with a tenure below ¯ve years. Young workers with a
tenure from six to fourteen years experience a new term of notice that is
shorter than the old-ToN. For young workers with a tenure of both ¯ve and
a tenure above fourteen years the old and new term of notice are exactly the
same.
A di®erent picture emerges for older workers. As can be seen in the
panels for the 50-, 55- and 60-year old workers, the old term of notice went
up by two weeks each tenure year for at least some of the years and the
maximum term of notice was longer than thirteen weeks. The di®erence
between the three panels is determined by how much older one is than 44
as this explains the number of two-week-years in the graph. For employ-
ees with a tenure below three years the new term of notice is longer than
before. Those who have been working for their employer for exactly three
years face the same term of notice before and after the introduction of the
`Flexwet'. The term of notice of workers with a tenure of four years and
over is shortened in the new scheme. Wherever there are multiple terms of
notice visible for an age-tenure combination this is because of the transition
scheme. This arrangement ensures that the term of notice moves closer to
the new calculation as the evaluation date is further from the 1st of January
1999. So, the employers of two workers with identical tenures (say ¯fteen
years) and age (say sixty years) but ¯red at di®erent times after the policy
change (say at the 1st of February 1999 and at the 1st of February 2002) will
face di®erent terms of notice (in this case ¯ve months and four-and-a-half
months).
Although the length of the term of notice that applies in the labor of-
¯ce path is set out by law, the `Flexwet' made it possible to agree upon
a di®erent term in a collective wage agreement. For the analysis in this
paper it is important to know to what extent this occurred6. Combining
information from the Ministry of Social A®airs and Employment and my
own calculations I ¯nd that after the 1st of January 1999 the legal term of
notice applied to eighty percent of workers7. If the deviation from the labor
6Smits (2000) and Smits and Samadhan (2002) report that the one month deduction,
with a minimum term of notice of one month, prevailed in practically all agreements
settled after the 1st of January 1999.
7About twenty percent of the workers do not fall under any sort of collective agreement
and hence the legal term of notice will always apply to them. The other eighty percent of
workers do fall under a collective agreement. I checked 112 (of about 200) collective wage
agreements in alphabetical order that were declared to hold for all workers in the relevant
sector between 1999 and 2002 and found that roughly seventy percent of these featured
the term of notice set out in the `Flexwet'. In sixteen percent of the cases a term of
notice calculation that is related to age and tenure still existed. In fourteen percent of the
analyzed collective wage agreements I found a constant term of notice. If I assume that
the distribution of workers is equal across the di®erent agreements it can be concluded
that eighty percent of workers on a permanent contract face the legal term of notice after
January 1st 1999.
10law, i.e. the measurement error in the real term of notice, is independent
of wages, the measurement error leads to an attenuation bias which will
drive the coe±cient of the term of notice down. Any signi¯cant results will
hence be underestimating the true causal e®ect of the term of notice. In the
Smits and Samadhan report the distribution of deviations over sectors seems
rather equal. Therefore, and because it is hard to know which agreement
speci¯cally applies to which worker, I abstract from the deviation in the col-
lective wage agreements and assume that the legal term of notice applies to
everyone. In the empirical speci¯cation I do control for industry categories.
For older, long tenured employees the introduction of the law on °exi-
bility and security thus resulted in a lower term of notice, but for shorter
tenured workers of all ages the term of notice increased. This variation in
the direction of the policy change will prove useful in identifying the causal
e®ect of the term of notice on wages in Section 6.
4 Empirical strategy
The dependent variable in my analysis is the log of the real gross hourly
wage rate. Several econometric di±culties trouble the identi¯cation of a
causal e®ect on this rate of the term of notice. Everything arises from the
fact that for the vast majority of employees in The Netherlands the term
of notice is determined by a deterministic function of the total number of
years an employee has worked for her employer and the number of years she
has done so while being 45 or older. The only other variable in°uencing the
employer's term of notice is calendar time.
ToNit = f(Tenureit;Tenure after 45it;Timet)
Note that calendar time both determines under which legal framework
a worker is ¯red and also plays a role in the transition arrangement from
the old towards the new scheme. The analyzed wage model can be seen in
equation 1, where Xit refers to personal characteristics, Zit to employer and
job characteristics, Ài to an individual-speci¯c time-invariant error term and
"it to an i.i.d error term.
Wagesit = h(ToNit(Tenureit;Tenure after 45it;Timet);Xit;Zit) + Ài + "it
(1)
The ¯rst econometric problem that arises is that of strong multi-
collinearity between the term of notice and the important covariates tenure
and age. When one would analyze periods in which the term of notice for-
mula doesn't change, its marginal e®ect on wages cannot be determined
ceteris paribus as changes in the notice period from one year to the next
would coincide with changes in tenure and age. To nevertheless answer the
research question, one can exploit an exogenous change in the term of notice
11that does not coincide with a change in tenure and age. To identify a causal
relationship between the term of notice and wages this paper therefore uses
the exogenous policy change described in Section 3: the introduction of the
law on °exibility and security in The Netherlands. It is not necessary to
apply any speci¯c type of policy evaluation method however. For reasons
explained below, I will estimate a ¯xed e®ects regression model which has
the additional trait that - through the subtracted average - it automatically
incorporates the exogenous variation in the term of notice.
Even when including the exogenous policy change, it is still crucial to
correctly control for tenure and tenure beyond the age of 45 so that an
estimated term of notice coe±cient does not capture any linear or non-
linear relationship between these variables and wages. Without imposing
any structure on the relationship beforehand I therefore include a full set of
all relevant tenure times tenure after 45 dummies. These dummies control
for the e®ect of tenure on wages, for the e®ect of tenure in older ages on
wages and for the interaction e®ect of the two on wages in the most °exible
way. I observe 43 di®erent tenures and 19 di®erent tenures experienced over
the age of 45. This leaves me with a total of 513 tenure times tenure beyond
45 dummies8. Naturally, other interactions between age and tenure, such as
tenure obtained over the age of 25, could potentially also in°uence wages.
However, omitting such interactions will not bias the coe±cient of interest
as these interactions do not enter the term of notice calculations.
Solving the multi-collinearity and non-linearity problems alone does not
result in unbiased estimates of the term of notice coe±cient. This is because
tenure and subsequently the term of notice su®er from an endogeneity prob-
lem. Tenure is an endogenous variable because unobservable characteristics
such as work attitude and innate ability in°uence tenure as well as wages.
As a result of the ¯xed formula for the notice period this endogeneity stains
the term of notice variable as well. A permanent endogeneity problem can
and will be addressed by applying a ¯xed e®ects type estimator that ¯lters
out any time-invariant individual components in the wage regression. Doing
so however does not remove a potential non-permanent e®ect of the unob-
served quality of a worker on tenure and wages induced by the 1999 policy
change9.
I will explain the non-permanent endogeneity problem by focusing on
two types of workers: low-quality workers that earn a relatively low wage
and high-quality workers that earn a relatively high wage. Here I assume
that the type is unobserved by the econometrician. Of both types of work-
ers, the relatively high-tenured ones (53 percent of the sample) will have
experienced a decrease in their employer's term of notice on the ¯rst of Jan-
8The full set of tenure interactions amounts to less than 45*19=817 dummies as the
tenure obtained beyond 45 will always be equal to or smaller than general tenure.
9I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
12uary 1999. It is possible that this decrease had a di®erent impact on the two
types in terms of layo®s and job switches. Low-quality employees could have
been ¯red sooner than their high-quality colleagues. These ¯red low-quality
workers would then either leave the sample or re-enter the sample in a new
job. This would lower the number of low-paid workers in the high term of
notice group, resulting in an overestimation of the e®ect of the term of notice
on wages. Note that underestimation is also a possibility, as the 1999 policy
change made high-tenured jobs less attractive in terms of employment pro-
tection. Hence all workers could have become more likely to voluntarily quit
a high-tenured job. High-quality workers potentially quitted their jobs more
often than their low-quality colleagues as they receive better alternative job
o®ers. This would increase the number of high-paid workers in the low term
of notice group, resulting in an underestimation of the term of notice e®ect
on wages. As it is unclear which job switches and which lay-o®s would have
taken place without the policy change, the described time-variant type of
endogeneity cannot be fully controlled for.
The quantitative importance of the e®ect can be looked at in more de-
tail. First, it can be checked whether the inclusion of those who get ¯red and
those who change jobs voluntarily drives the term of notice results. To check
the robustness of estimates I run a wage model on various restricted samples,
such as a sample without anyone that is ever observed as being ¯red and
a sample without anyone that is ever observed to voluntarily switch jobs.
The results of these exercises are hopeful and can be found in the sensitivity
analysis in Section 6. It seems that the term of notice results are robust to
the inclusion or exclusion of various groups of mobile workers.
Second, it can be checked whether the number of ¯rings and job switches
before and after 1-1-1999 di®ered substantially. Table 1 shows what has
happened to the workers in my sample in the year following their interview.
It shows unconditional percentages for those whose term of notice would
have or went down and for those whose term of notice would have or went
up. The latter category also includes individuals whose term of notice re-
mained unchanged. The ¯rst two columns therefore present the percentages
for relatively high-tenured workers, with an average tenure of fourteen years,
while the last two columns present the percentages for relatively low-tenured
workers, with an average tenure of six years. Unsurprisingly, all job turnover
percentages are lower for the high-tenured group than for the low-tenured
group. Moreover, both groups experienced more dismissals and voluntary
job quits after 1-1-1999. Overestimation of the e®ect of the term of notice
on wages requires a substantial number of low-quality, high-tenured workers
that are ¯red because of the policy change. Since only 0.2 percent more
high-tenured workers were ¯red after 1-1-1999, it is unlikely that the non-
permanent endogeneity of tenure drives the positive e®ect on wages found
in Section 6.
Table 1 deserves more explanation. Although theory predicts that the
13Table 1: What happens to employees in the year following inclusion in the
sample, before and after 1-1-1999. Sample divided on the basis of tenure
and tenure over 45.
`Flexwet' decreased ToN `Flexwet' increased ToN
or kept constant
(High average tenure) (Low average tenure)
Before After Before After
Same job 93.4% 91.3% 90.0% 82.2%
Fired from job 2.5% 2.7% 5.0% 8.1%
Quitted - Better job 0.6% 0.9% 1.1% 1.6%
Quitted - Personal 3.4% 5.1% 3.9% 8.0%
Total known 3,518 4,601 2,721 4,201
Attrition - Unknown 351 728 324 770
group who `su®ered' from the policy change by being less protected should
display larger increases in job turnover rates this is not what is happening.
In fact, the group of individuals with more incentives to stay in their jobs
(as their term of notice mostly increased) displayed larger increases in these
rates. Apparently, other economic circumstances and policy changes that
occurred between 1997 and 2001 a®ected the job °ows of the two groups
of workers in the opposite direction. If this is the case, wages might have
seen an opposite development as well. Fortunately, it is possible to control
for these di®erential time trends in wages as selection into the higher- or
lower term of notice group depends on tenure and tenure beyond the age
of 45 only. In the regressions in Section 6 di®erential wage trends are con-
trolled for in a °exible way by adding interaction terms between a dummy
for those surveys after 1-1-1999 and the full set of tenure times tenure after
45 dummies. While doing so, the transition arrangement that was part of
the `Flexwet' ensures that there is enough variation in the term of notice
after 1999 for identi¯cation of its e®ect on wages. Table 2 in Section 6 shows
that excluding the possibility of di®erential wage trends from the regressions
overestimates the e®ect of the term of notice of wages.
The 1999 policy change does have one drawback following directly from
the advantage laid out above. The separate e®ect of employment protection
on wages of newly hired individuals cannot be analyzed. As Leonardi and
Pica (2007) do, it would be interesting to look at this group separately as
wages of outsiders (newly hired individuals) could respond di®erently to a
change in employment protection than wages of insiders. As all new em-
ployees are under the same term of notice scheme from the 1st of January
1999 onwards, the e®ect of the change in the term of notice cannot be dis-
tinguished from other wage developments in this group. Table 2 does show
estimates for newly hired individuals only to illustrate that a negative e®ect
14of employment protection on wages is unlikely.
Given the discussion above, the term of notice results will be referred to
as `causal' from now on. The causal e®ect I am interested in can thus be
obtained as the marginal e®ect of the term of notice variable in a regression
of wages on the term of notice and the full set of tenure times tenure beyond
the age of 45 dummies (and interactions of this set with a dummy for all
periods after 1-1-1999). To furthermore control for other determinants of
wages I include a full set of age dummies, a full set of time dummies, the job
characteristics hours worked and level of occupation and the employer char-
acteristics company size and industry type. Equation 2 is then estimated as
a ¯xed e®ects linear regression model using the log of the real gross hourly
wage rate as the dependent variable. In this equation Xit refers to all per-
sonal covariates, Zit to employer and job characteristics,
P2001
t=1998 Timet to
a set of time dummies, Ài to an individual-speci¯c time-invariant error term
and "it to an i.i.d error term.
Wagesit = ® + ¯ToN ¤ ToNit + °0Xit + ±0Zit +
2001 X
t=1998
³tTimet + Ài + "it (2)
5 Data
Five waves of the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP), a household survey,
are used for the empirical analysis of the research question (1997-2001). This
longitudinal dataset has been collected annually around April by Statistics
Netherlands from 1984 to 2002. I use all available waves before and after
the 1999 policy change that contained information on the type of contract a
worker was on and on the sector an individual was employed in. Note that a
job in this paper refers to a contract between an employee and an employer
and that internal promotions ore demotions thus do not play a role. Only
employees with a permanent contract are included in the sample as employ-
ers only face a legal term of notice for these workers. This leaves me with
a ¯nal sample of 17,214 observations. Although the same individuals are
observed multiple times in the sample, it is not balanced. 79 percent of the
individuals are observed both before and after the policy change, 7 percent
only before and 15 percent only after.
The dependent variable in the wage regressions is the logarithm of the
real gross hourly wage rate. Net wages are not directly observed. Over the
analyzed period the income tax legislation did not change substantially. I
use the consumer price index published by Statistics Netherlands to com-
pute real wages (base year is 2005) and the conversion rate between the
Dutch guilder and the euro that has been ¯xed to 2.20371 from the 31st of
December 1998 onwards. For simplicity I use this exchange rate for the 1997
and 1998 waves as well. In each survey year, all observations below the 0.1th
percentile and above the 99.9th wage percentile are dropped, because rates
15Figure 2: Kernel density estimation of the hourly wage rate for the period
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in these areas seem unlikely. Figure 2 shows a kernel density estimation
of the cleaned variable both for the period before the introduction of the
`Flexwet' and the period after. The distribution in real wages is very similar
across the two periods. The average wage rate before the policy change was
(2005 real) e15.59 euro per hour (s.d. 5.83) and after the policy change it
was e15.89 (s.d. 6.08). Those with a tenure above two years earn more
(e16.63, s.d. 5.72) than those who are new to their employer (e13.41, s.d.
6.07). As expected, those over 45 also earn more on average (e17.76, s.d.
6.56) than their younger counterparts (e14.79, s.d. 5.42).
Figure 3 provides information on the average terms of notice in my sam-
ple before and after the policy change for di®erent tenures and ages. Before
1999 the aggregate average term of notice was 2.1 months (s.d. 1.5), whereas
it was 1.8 months (s.d. 1.1) after the introduction of the `Flexwet'. Figure 3
also presents the ninety percent con¯dence intervals. It can be seen that the
new law increased the minimum and decreased the maximum notice period
and that the variation in employment protection across ages and tenures
was diminished. In the new scheme, a more distinct stepwise pattern by
tenure is also observed.
Figures A-2 and A-3 in the appendix show histograms of the ages and
tenures of the workers in my sample both before and after the ¯rst of Jan-
uary 1999. Before 1999, the average age is 39.4 years (s.d. 9.4) and the
average tenure is 10.2 years (s.d. 8.7). After the ¯rst of January 1999, the
average age in the sample is 39.9 years (s.d. 9.8) and the average tenure is
9.9 years (s.d. 9.2). A relatively large group of employees are only shortly
16Figure 3: Average employer's Term of Notice and its ninety percent con-
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17employed at their employer, and this is more so in the period after 1-1-1999.
In the sensitivity analysis in the next section, I check whether only looking
at newly hired employees, or only at all individuals other than the newly
hired a®ects the term of notice results. This is not the case.
The regressions presented in table 2 include the following control vari-
ables of which the descriptive statistics can be found in table A-1 in the
appendix: all tenure times tenure over the age of 45 dummies, all age dum-
mies, dummies for the years 1998 to 2001, hours worked, industry and size
of the organization in which the worker was employed and level of her oc-
cupation. Table A-1 also includes information on a dummy representing
whether someone took up training paid by the employer and several educa-
tion dummies. These variables are used in the regressions presented in table
3.
6 Results
6.1 Impact of term of notice on wages
Table 2 presents the results of the empirical wage analysis. The table only
displays the coe±cients and standard errors of the variable of interest - the
term of notice. This is done for expositional reasons as the inclusion of all
age and tenure times tenure beyond 45 dummies in the regressions makes
these di±cult to interpret10. All speci¯cations include observations of before
and after the 1999 policy change. Hence, multi-collinearity problems can no
longer bother the estimates. Note that in both table 2 and 3 all standard
errors were clustered at the individual level. The regression diagnostics can
be found in table A-1 in the appendix.
The coe±cient and standard error in the ¯rst row refers to a ¯xed
e®ects linear regression estimate of the log of real gross hourly wages on
the term of notice and the described covariates. The model is preferred
as it includes interactions between the dummies that determine the term
of notice (tenure times tenure after the age of 45 cells) and a dummy for
the period after the ¯rst of January 1999. As discussed in Section 4 this
is done to make sure that the term of notice coe±cient does not capture
any di®erential wage developments over time other than the introduction of
the `Flexwet'. In the preferred model, the term of notice coe±cient equals
0.0324 and is highly signi¯cant. This means that for each additional notice
month the hourly wage rate of a worker goes up by three percent, ceteris
paribus. The estimate in the second row is biased because the fact that
wage trends could have been di®erent for low and high-tenured workers is
ignored. The result in row two suggests that an additional legal month of
notice increases the wage rate, ceteris paribus, by 5.67 percent, which is a
10All results are however available upon request from the author.
18Table 2: Term of notice coe±cients and standard errors in wage models.
Dependent: log of real hourly wage rate.
Model Sample Coe±cient S.e. N
1 Preferred Full sample 0.0324*** (0.005) 17,214
2 No interact. Full sample 0.0567*** (0.007) 17,214
3 OLS Full sample 0.0077 (0.007) 17,214
4 Preferred Without 1999 0.0324*** (0.005) 13,807
5 Preferred Balanced panel 0.0267*** (0.007) 8,650
6 Preferred Ind before/after 0.0390*** (0.005) 13,582
7 2000 interact. Full sample 0.0351*** (0.005) 17,214
8 2001 interact. Full sample 0.0375*** (0.005) 17,214
9 No interact. Newly hired 0.2084 (0.305) 3,462
10 Preferred Tenure >1 0.0296*** (0.007) 13,752
11 Preferred No lay-o®s 0.0307*** (0.005) 16,053
12 Preferred No job switches 0.0356*** (0.006) 14,133
13 Preferred No lay-o®s/switches 0.0337*** (0.006) 13,333
¤ p < 0:05,
¤¤ p < 0:01,
¤¤¤ p < 0:001
All regressions include all tenure times tenure after 45-dummies, all age dummies, year
dummies, hours worked, industry type, size of company, level of occupation and
a constant.
The preferred model includes interaction terms of the tenure cells and a dummy for
after the policy change.
19substantial overestimation of the impact of the term of notice. In the third
row a coe±cient and standard error are presented for a pooled OLS regres-
sion and the regression estimate therefore su®ers from a time-independent
endogeneity problem. The e®ect of the term of notice on wages is only 0.77
percent in this speci¯cation and not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. Not
controlling for the time-invariant endogeneity of tenure can hence underes-
timate the e®ect of the term of notice on wages.
To check the robustness of the results in the preferred model it was es-
timated on several samples and the coe±cients obtained in this sensitivity
analysis can be found in rows four to thirteen. The analysis clearly con¯rms
that the positive signi¯cant e®ect of EP on wages is robust. The model in the
fourth row of table 2 does not use observations recorded between April 1998
and March 1999. This was done to ensure that the causal e®ect of the term
of notice on wages is not the result of wage setting behavior anticipating
the January 1999 policy change. Although I do not ¯nd such anticipation,
note that such behavior would not contradict but rather emphasize a causal
e®ect of the term of notice on wages. The ¯fth line displays the term of no-
tice coe±cient for the wage model on a balanced panel sample in which all
individuals are observed ¯ve years in a row. The estimates are reassuring as
the ninety-¯ve percent con¯dence interval of the signi¯cant term of notice
coe±cient includes 0.0324. The model presented in row six only includes
individuals that are observed both before and after the policy change (so
that I loose twenty-one percent of the sample). The associated e®ect of the
term of notice is even larger than that found in row one: a four percent wage
increase per month. To be more prudent, my preferred model thus includes
the individuals that are only observed at either side of the policy change.
Row seven and eight display term of notice coe±cients for models in
which the possibility for di®erential time trends with di®erent cut-o® years
was included. The model in row seven includes interactions with a dummy
for all periods after 1-1-2000. The model in row eight includes the same
interactions but then with a dummy for all periods after 1-1-2001. It seems
that the causal e®ect found in row one is not driven by my choice of in-
teractions as the coe±cients in row seven (0.0351) and eight (0.0375) are
even larger. Row nine and ten present the estimates of the wage model on
a sample of newly-hired individuals only and on a selected higher-tenured
sample respectively. Note that the latter coe±cient will be biased because
di®erential wage trends cannot be taken into account and because selection
into this group is highly selective. The selection problem also plagues the
longer-tenured individuals estimate. However, the positive marginal e®ects
that I ¯nd in both models (0.2084, not signi¯cant, and 0.0296, signi¯cant)
are reassuring.
As mentioned in Section 4 including individual-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects does
not solve all endogeneity problems in the data. Although the time-variant
type of endogeneity cannot fully be controlled for I can show that the inclu-
20sion of marginal groups does not severely a®ect the term of notice results.
In the estimation for row eleven in table 2 all those individuals are excluded
that are ever observed as being ¯red from 1996 to 2002. This decreases the
sample size to 16,053. The inclusion of this group of people could potentially
overestimate the term of notice e®ect. Indeed the term of notice coe±cient
in row eleven is lower than in the ¯rst row. However, it is precisely esti-
mated at 3.07 percent, which is similar to the estimate in row one. Row
twelve presents results for a sample in which those individuals that ever
voluntarily switched jobs from 1996 to 2002 are excluded. The inclusion
of these workers would perhaps underestimate the term of notice e®ect, as
explained in Section 4. The result in row twelve does suggest this is the
case. The estimated term of notice coe±cient (0.0356) is closer to 0.04 than
to 0.03. Row thirteen presents an estimate in which both groups, the ever
¯red and the ever job switchers, are excluded. This leaves me a sample of
13,333 individuals who either stay in their job over the sample period or who
quit their job for personal reasons. Using this subgroup of the population, I
estimate a signi¯cant e®ect of the term of notice on wages of around three
percent per month (0.0337) as well.
I thus ¯nd evidence that the employer's term of notice has a strong
positive causal e®ect on wages. A three percent higher wage rate for each
additional month of notice is a relevant and substantial side-e®ect of this
type of employment protection. For a prime-aged worker in my sample, aged
50 with 15 years of tenure in 1998, who experienced a drop in term of notice
from 3.15 months to 2.15 months because of the 1999 policy change, this
equals a loss in the hourly wage rate of three percent. On a yearly basis this
employee, who worked 38 hours a week and earned 19.71 euros, therefore
lost e1,262 because of the lower employer's term of notice.
6.2 Suggestive evidence of mechanism at play
As discussed in Section 2 there are two plausible reasons for a positive e®ect
of employment protection on wages. First, insider/outsider theory suggests
that the bargaining position of insiders is enhanced by better protection
when unions only represent incumbent workers. In wage negotiations this
could then drive wages up. Second, employment protection creates more
incentives for ¯rms to invest in workers and for workers to invest in ¯rm-
speci¯c human capital. These investments will then lead to higher produc-
tivity and higher wages. Using the data at hand I can only provide suggestive
evidence on which of the two mechanisms seems more important. For this
purpose table 3 in included.
In rows one and two I present the term of notice coe±cients of models
estimating formal training on the same covariates as in row one of table 3.
The dependent variable here is a dummy equal to one when the employee
is enrolled or has been over the previous year in a course or training pro-
21Table 3: Term of notice coe±cients and standard errors. Dependent row
1-2: dummy for currently following formal training paid by the employer.
Dependent row 3-5: log of real hourly wage rate.
Topic Model Coe±cient S.e. N
1 Training FE OLS -0.0075 (0.006) 17,434
2 Training Probit -0.0705** (0.023) 15,475
3 Wages Low educated 0.0574*** (0.022) 1,864
4 Wages Middle educated 0.0318*** (0.009) 6,017
5 Wages High educated 0.0277*** (0.008) 4,017
¤ p < 0:05,
¤¤ p < 0:01,
¤¤¤ p < 0:001
All regressions include the same controls as in table 2.
gram that her employer is paying for. Although investment in a employee-
employer match could involve more or other things than formal training,
one would expect a positive coe±cient of the term of notice on formal train-
ing take-up if the investment mechanism would play a signi¯cant role. Row
one depicts results for a linear probability model and row two for a pooled
probit estimation11. Both estimates are negative (-0.0075, not signi¯cantly,
and -0.0705, signi¯cantly), suggesting that better protected individuals take
up less training o®ered by their employer. Arulampalam et al. (2004) found
a similar e®ect using the European Community Household Panel.
In rows three to ¯ve I present term of notice coe±cient estimates for the
preferred wage model on three di®erent samples: the sample is divided into
those with a low level of education (regular high school or lower), those with
a middle level of education (higher level high school or vocational train-
ing) and those with a high level of education (higher tertiary education).
This was done as I suspected a potential investment mechanism to have
di®erential e®ects over the unobserved quality of workers. If I assume that
there is a strong positive correlation between education and this quality
and if I furthermore assume that the gains from investing in match-speci¯c
human capital would be higher for workers with higher abilities, the better-
incentives-to-invest e®ect would ensure a higher term of notice coe±cient for
the better educated. Note that ¯nding such a higher coe±cient could also
indicate that better able employees also excel at wage bargaining. However,
rows three to ¯ve in table 3 paint the opposite picture. The term of notice
coe±cient for the low educated equals 5.74 percent, while for the middle
and high educated it is around three percent. Low educated individuals
thus bene¯t more from employment protection in terms of wages. If one
indeed believes that higher educated individuals are better able to obtain
match-speci¯c human capital, this result also invalidates the investment ar-
11The large number of independent variables rendered estimating a ¯xed e®ects binary
choice model impossible.
22gument.
These pieces of evidence point in the direction of an improved bargain-
ing position as the mechanism driving the positive e®ect of employment
protection on wages. In the Dutch context, a longer term of notice seems to
improve the position of employees in wage negotiations such that they are
able to extract a larger part of the rent generated in their job. Note that this
conclusion should be treated with caution as the evidence is only suggestive.
More research will be necessary to come up with a decisive answer on what
exactly explains the positive term of notice coe±cients.
7 Conclusion
This paper establishes the causal e®ect of the employer's term of notice
on the wage level of employees. The legal term of notice is de¯ned as the
amount of time a ¯rm is required to notify a worker in advance of her up-
coming dismissal. As such, the term of notice is an important component
of ¯ring costs and thus of employment protection.
In order to ¯nd a causal link, I have performed a ¯xed e®ects estima-
tion exploiting an exogenous policy change in the term of notice. This
procedure corrects for the time-invariant endogeneity of tenure and for the
strong multi-collinearity between the term of notice, tenure and age. The
latter problem arises because tenure and age, or more speci¯cally tenure
and tenure obtained while being 45 or over, are the only inputs in the legal
formula that calculates the term of notice. The relevant policy change is the
1999 introduction of the law on °exibility and security (`Flexwet') in The
Netherlands. This law altered the calculation of the legal term of notice such
that the term of notice of low-tenured individuals of all ages went up and
the term of notice of older high-tenured individuals went down. Five waves
of the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) were used for the empirical anal-
ysis (1997-2001) in which a ¯xed e®ects linear regression model is estimated
using the logarithm of real gross hourly wages. A possible limitation of my
approach is that tenure and the term of notice are also in°uenced by the
policy change itself, thereby generating a time-variant endogeneity problem.
Robustness analysis however suggests that this type of endogeneity is not
driving the results.
The preferred econometric model unveils a very signi¯cant, positive
causal e®ect of the `dormant' term of notice on the real hourly gross wage
rate. An increase in the term of notice of one month leads to three percent
higher wages. The arguments presented in Section 2 describing a negative
e®ect of employment protection on wages thus do not hold in the analyzed
context. This was to be expected for Lazear's (1990) e±ciency wage argu-
ment as the Dutch labor market institutions do not resemble his competitive
model with individual wage-setting. The same could be said for Pissarides'
23(2001) exposition about an endogenous term of notice as the term of notice
is decided upon by policy-makers.
The theoretical literature provides two plausible reasons for a positive
e®ect of employment protection on wages. First, insider/outsider theory
suggests that the bargaining position of insiders is enhanced by better pro-
tection when unions only represent incumbent workers. In wage negotiations
this could then drive wages up. Second, employment protection creates more
incentives for ¯rms to invest in workers and for workers to invest in ¯rm-
speci¯c human capital. These investments will then lead to higher produc-
tivity and higher wages. More empirical research needs to be conducted to
ultimately decide which of these theories is best describing reality. To do
so, detailed information on individual employees such as longitudinal micro-
data re°ecting individual productivity is needed.
Using the available information instead, I present suggestive evidence
that undermines the investment argument. First, better protected employ-
ees do not have a higher take-up rate of formal training paid by their em-
ployer. If anything, those with a longer term of notice participate less in
such courses, which is not what one would expect if the investment mech-
anism was playing a large role. Second, the e®ect of the term of notice on
wages is much stronger for lower-educated individuals than for middle- and
high educated individuals. If one believes that higher educated individuals
are better able to obtain match-speci¯c human capital, this also suggests
that the investment argument is least important. Hence, the bargaining ar-
gument wins the ¯rst round in the battle of the mechanisms. In the Dutch
context, better employment protection probably improves employees' wage
bargaining position such that a larger part of the pro¯ts °ows to the em-
ployee rather than to the employer. Policy makers should be aware of this
side-e®ect of the term of notice on wages. If the wage bargaining argu-
ment is indeed stronger, employment protection creates rents for incumbent
employees which policy-makers will want to avoid.
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Appendix
Figure A-1: The ratio of lay-o®s through the labor o±ce over the total
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27Table A-1: Descriptive statistics of all variables (N=17,214)
Mean Sd Min Max
Log gross wage rate (per hour) 3.473 0.409 0.387 4.529
Term of notice (months) 1.935 1.273 0.231 6.000
Age (years) 39.694 9.661 17 65
Tenure (years) 10.028 8.996 1 43
Tenure beyond 45 1.629 3.262 0 19
Dataset 1998.995 1.419 1997 2001
Hours worked (per week) 36.231 10.246 12 89
Agriculture Omitted
Fisheries 0.000 0.011 0 1
Mining 0.012 0.110 0 1
Industry 0.143 0.350 0 1
Trade 0.006 0.079 0 1
Construction 0.060 0.237 0 1
Retail 0.109 0.312 0 1
Hospitality 0.014 0.119 0 1
Transport 0.058 0.233 0 1
Financial institutions 0.043 0.203 0 1
Real estate 0.098 0.297 0 1
Public services 0.090 0.287 0 1
Education 0.081 0.273 0 1
Health care 0.158 0.364 0 1
Environmental services 0.026 0.158 0 1
Personal services 0.001 0.029 0 1
Other industry 0.099 0.299 0 1
Company 1-19 employees 0.173 0.378 0 1
Company 20-49 employees 0.125 0.330 0 1
Company 50-99 employees 0.100 0.300 0 1
Company >99 employees Omitted
Unknown level 0.065 0.246 0 1
Elementary occupations 0.053 0.223 0 1
Lower occupations 0.271 0.445 0 1
Middle occupations 0.342 0.474 0 1
Higher occupations 0.210 0.407 0 1
Academic occupations Omitted
Employer-paid training 0.079 0.270 0 1
Lower educated 0.1083 0.311 0 1
Middle educated 0.3495 0.477 0 1
Higher educated 0.2334 0.423 0 1
28Table A-2: Regression diagnostics of the models in table 2 and 3.
Model Sample Aic Ind. N
1 Preferred Full sample -21,228 5,522 17,214
2 No interact. Full sample -21,178 5,522 17,214
3 OLS Full sample 8,445 5,522 17,214
4 Preferred Without 1999 -17,993 5,396 13,807
5 Preferred Balanced panel -7,375 1,730 8,650
6 Preferred Ind before/after -14.261 3,189 13,582
7 2000 interact. Full sample -21,350 5,522 17,214
8 2001 interact. Full sample -21,432 5,522 17,214
9 No interact. Newly hired -3,004 2,102 3,462
10 Preferred Tenure >1 -22,893 4,659 13,752
11 Preferred No lay-o®s -20,649 5,078 16,053
12 Preferred No job switches -18,930 4,565 14,133
13 Preferred No lay-o®s/switches -18,621 4,248 13,333
1 FE OLS Training sample -6,800 5,561 17,434
2 Probit Training sample 8,964 5,408 15,475
3 Preferred Low educated -2,075 612 1,864
4 Preferred Middle educated -6,964 1,681 6,017
5 Preferred High educated -5,502 1,148 4,017
Akaike's information criterion in fourth column, number of individuals in ¯fth column.
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